Past research suggests that marketing communications create expectations that influence the way consumers subsequently learn from their product experiences. Since postexperience information can also be important and is widespread for established goods and services, it is appropriate to ask about the cognitive effects of these efforts. The postexperience advertising situation is conceptualized here as an instant source-forgetting problem where the language and imagery from the recently presented advertising become confused with consumers' own experiential memories. It is suggested that, through a reconstructive memory process, this advertising information affects how and what consumers remember. Consumers may come to believe that their past product experience had been as suggested by the advertising. Over time this postexperience advertising information can become incorporated into the brand schema and influence future product decisions.
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The focus of this investigation is given to the right-hand The present research proposes that marketers can manside of this diagram: reconstructive retrieval. Consumer age consumers' reconstruction process through postexpeexperiences previously have been conceptualized by marrience advertising messages that overshadow information keters as ''patterns permanently retained in the central learned in a direct experience. Postexperience advertising nervous system'' (Burke and Srull 1988, p. 56) . New can create an association to the original experience by research suggests otherwise: ''A keypoint of agreement referencing sensory aspects and inducing positive imagbetween cognitive and biological theories is that memoery of that experience (Puto and Wells 1988) . In the case ries do not preserve a literal representation of the world; of a direct taste experience, the representations elicited memories are constructed from fragments that are distribby the recently received postexperience advertising will uted across different brain regions, and depend on influovershadow respondents' memory of the actual taste so ences operating in the present as well as the past'' their memory will be of a more flavorful juice than they (Schacter 1996a, p. 13527) . Research shows that when actually experienced. (One could conceive of this situapeople try to recall a past experience, the information is tion as a classic source-monitoring error where the mental assimilated within the existing memory schema, causing representation of the taste becomes confused with the them to remember only what fits their expectations. At actual taste.) The memory created by the advertising will the same time, information acquired after an experience feel real to respondents, as real as a veridical memory. The can transform the memory of that experience (Loftus memory effects will endure over time as brand schema 1982). In recall and recognition people tend to include information because own-experienced information is ideas or elements inferred or related to the original experithought to be less resistant to decay (Neisser 1982). ence but not actually part of the original experience itself (Bartlett 1932) .
Postexperience information is most likely to distort EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW AND memories when it is very similar to, or conjures up images
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
which may be mistaken for, the actual experienced information. Garry et al. (1996) in their work on ''imagination The purpose of this experimental investigation was to determine whether objective sensory information such as inflation'' propose that recently generated images become accessible in the mind, people forget the source of their taste can be transformed in memory through exposure to postexperience advertising and, if so, to determine imaging, and they report the newly imagined event as having happened to them. Recent evidence on ''verbal whether this occurs prior to judgment processes. In other words, do consumers know they are being influenced in overshadowing'' shows postexperience imaging can influence perceptual memories such as taste. Melcher and this manner? The misinformation paradigm from cognitive psychology has been adopted to investigate these Schooler (1996) found that people who verbalize after tasting a wine show far lower accuracy in recognizing issues. In this paradigm respondents experience an event; in the present case, taste a new orange juice. Later some that wine than those that do not verbalize their experience. They believe that the recently generated mental represen-respondents receive suggestive information, here advertising suggesting the taste was flavorful, while a control tation overshadows what is learned in the perceptual experience because language cannot capture the complexity group does not receive this information. All are asked to identify what they experienced earlier (e.g., the orange of the experience. / 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res juice they tasted). The respondents' tendency to accept ence but show evidence of advertising influencing their memory. information presented after the direct experience as being true of the original experience, that is, identifying a more
The subjective experience of remembering, of becoming consciously aware in the present of a past feeling or flavorful juice than the one they had tasted, is evidence that the postexperience advertising systematically influ-event, is itself an experience. ''It is autonoetic consciousness that confers special phenomenological flavour to the enced the reconstruction process.
Several marketing theorists have found postexperience remembering of past events, the flavour that distinguishes it from other kinds of awareness such as those characteriz-information has affected consumer judgments and have described these effects in terms of a belief updating pro-ing, perceiving, thinking, imaging, or dreaming.'' (Tulving 1985, p. 3) . It is that type of experience that can make cess (Hoch and Ha 1986; Levin and Gaeth 1988; Smith 1993) . Although learning new information may update us believe the representations are veridical, unaffected by other information. beliefs, the cognitive effects of this process have not been investigated, and in some cases, researchers have inferred New measures are allowing us to capture how respondents feel about the product of their memory retrieval. a memory process that is inconsistent with what we now know regarding the constructive nature of memory. Hoch According to Tulving (1985) , the phenomenological aspects of remembering differ. ''Remembering'' is a con-and Ha (1986) suggest that the recently received information may momentarily inhibit retrieval of the experienced scious reexperiencing of the original event, while ''knowing'' is general knowledge learned without consciously information, rather than change its composition. The other two articles used information integration theory to de-accessing the past. Tulving (1985) found that by asking respondents about the quality of their memory, using this scribe their effects; Levin and Gaeth (1988, p. 377) propose that ''the two sources of information available to ''remember'' versus ''know'' distinction (R/K) when they recall or recognize a previously encountered item, the judge are balanced in arriving at an integrated impression.'' Similar to the Bayesian independence assumption, the probability of the ''remember'' response can serve as an index of the extent to which autonoetic (explicit) information integration theory states information is discretely stored in memory and that attribute information consciousness is involved in the recovery of past events. This R/K measure has been validated on the human brain is separate from judgment. It further proposes that there is no reorganization in memory (Anderson 1991). This using positron emission tomography (PET). Researchers find that ''remember'' judgments produce greater meta-independence assumption has been found to be limiting in explaining memory and inference effects (e.g., Huber bolic activity in the sensory cortices (Schacter, personal communication, 1997). and McCann 1982) .
It is proposed here that postexperience advertising can The experimental section is organized as follows: first, a pilot study is described where the taste stimuli and have an effect on memory prior to the judgment process. Loftus et al. (1989) find that newly created memories memory test are calibrated. Experiment 1 tests whether postexperience advertising influences consumer memory from postexperience suggestion are reported quickly, with high confidence, countering the idea that two pieces of of a taste experience. After finding a memory effect, experiment 2 addresses additional concerns regarding the information are consciously compared in judgment. Moreover, researchers' efforts to reduce the postexperi-fate of these experiential memories over time and in more typical consumer contexts. In this experiment, the adver-ence effect on memory of their respondents by warning them about the misleading information's lack of credibil-tising was found to exert a deep structural change in memory, particularly if the information had been consis-ity are not effective (Greene, Flynn, and Loftus 1982) . Further, neurological evidence suggests this modification tent with the initial experience. It was hypothesized that the postexperience advertising information exerted two occurs prior to higher cortical processing (Schacter 1996b) . As a means to further investigate the judgment levels of effect: the first in the immediate verbal overshadowing found in experiment 1 across all levels of quality, issue, the quality levels of initial taste quality experience were varied in this experiment. One might suspect that and the second in the development of a brand schema found in experiment 2. A follow-up study was conducted as the discrepancy between advertising and experience got large (e.g., really bad taste and very positive advertis-to determine whether the verbal overshadowing effect could be reinstated after a week's delay by providing the ing), there would be less reliance on the advertising if the latter information is weighted at the point of judgment advertising closely before recall. (Smith 1993) .
Missing from the judgment models is an explanation of why consumers believe their past experience had been
PILOT TEST
as suggested by the ad. Consumers may falsely assess product experiences and overstate diagnosticity of those A pilot test was conducted to ensure that the three levels of orange juice used in the main experiments were experiences if the advertising alters their memory (Hoch and Deighton 1989) . The phenomenological aspects of perceived as qualitatively different. Respondents rated each of the three orange juice samples on seven-point remembering are important to understanding why consumers believe they are relying on their own past experi-attribute scales: taste; sweetness; consistency; freshness; / 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res ingredients; and quality. 1 These attributes loaded on one ''worst'' sample, labeled ''1,'' having twice as much vinegar, water, and salt as the ''bad'' sample. factor, with coefficient alpha of .90, and were combined to form an average rating of evaluation. The three samples
The identification test was modeled after McCloskey and Zaragoza's (1985) modified test procedure, which were found to be distinct, F(2, 216) Å 57.82, p õ .0001. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferonni technique (set they say reduces the likelihood that the postexperience influence is occurring at the point of judgment. In their at p õ .05) found each level to be significantly different from one another, X V Å 2.3 for the ''bad'' sample, X V Å 3.3 modified test, the choice is between the original accurate information and a new piece of information. In the present for the ''medium'' sample, and X V Å 4.1 for the ''good'' sample. Overall 71 percent properly identified the memory test respondents choose among a wide range of alternatives-five discrete orange juice taste formula-''good'' sample correctly as the best, and 89 percent properly identified the ''bad'' as the worst.
tions. These levels also allow for a blended representation to be elicited, where both the taste evidence and advertising participate in the reconstruction, forming a new repre-EXPERIMENT 1 sentation (Loftus 1977; Metcalfe 1990) . As in the modi-Respondents received a sample of a ''new'' orange fied test, respondents are asked to correctly identify what juice. The sample was either ''good,'' ''medium,'' or they tasted earlier-a sample of orange juice-from al-''bad'' tasting, depending upon the experimental conditernatives they previously had not tasted. This modality tion. Later in the hour, half of the respondents were prematch is important because some psychologists (e.g., Pezsented advertising information that suggested the orange dek and Greene 1993) have criticized verbal tests in misjuice had excellent taste quality. All respondents were information experiments because they are a closer match then tested on the memories of their taste experiences.
to the postexperience information than the original event The primary issue was whether postexperience advertisand may result in a bias toward that response if a familiaring would change how they remembered their taste expeity criterion is adopted. rience; would they be more likely to recall and identify a more favorable taste experience because of the advertis-Procedure ing information?
Respondents came to the setting expecting an orange juice taste test. The experiments were run in groups rang-Method ing from 13 to 18 people. The experiment began with Participants respondents tasting a sample of ''Orange Grove'' orange juice (a fictitious brand name). In order to reduce demand One hundred fifty undergraduates (66 female, 84 male) effects, the experimenter said that she was running the participated in this study for course credit. study for an outside company, and they should report only their true feelings because that is what will be most Design helpful to the manufacturer for the introduction of this new product (such instructions have been used in other A 3 (level of experience: good, medium, bad) 1 2 advertising/experience studies to create a disassociation; (advertising: advertising, no advertising) between-sube.g., Smith and Swinyard 1983) . Respondents were told jects design was used. Respondents were assigned ranthat this was a new orange juice brand on the market domly to one of these six conditions. Any differences in and that they would later be asked to evaluate its taste. cell sizes are due to respondents skipping over measures Depending upon the experimental condition, respondents in the questionnaire (which did not occur often).
received a two-ounce sample of either the ''good,'' ''medium,'' or ''bad'' orange juice and ate crackers to cleanse Stimuli their palates. They also inspected a mock-up ''Orange The three orange juice levels were those pretested in Grove'' container. the pilot study. For the memory identification test, respon-Respondents were told that they would be making judgdents were asked to pick the one from among five samples ments about the juice later in the hour but first needed to that matched the flavor they tasted earlier. The three aforecomplete a survey for another instructor. This distraction mentioned levels were used-the ''bad'' sample was latask lasted about 15 minutes and had no relationship to beled ''2,'' the ''medium'' sample labeled ''3,'' and the the present experiment. The advertising groups were then ''good'' sample labeled ''4.'' In addition, respondents told that Orange Grove was trying to determine the type had the choice of picking two other samples in their memof ad campaign that would best launch their product on ory test: ''best'' sample, labeled ''5,'' made with the a national level. Respondents were shown two ads to Minute Maid concentrate according to directions and a evaluate within a five-minute time period. Both ads were transformational in nature, describing the positive taste qualities of the Orange Grove juice. For instance, one ad touted the home-grown company origins and asked read- Coding Procedure to the packaging of frozen concentrate juice, describing how Orange Grove preserves the ''integrity of Florida Two independent judges coded respondents' reactions orange taste'' by cutting out the middleman. Both ads to the ads and the recall statements of their taste experiended with the slogan, ''Orange Grove. Experience the ences. They had no knowledge of the experimental taste Florida's been talking about.'' Respondents rated hypotheses. Their interrater reliability was .99 and an each ad on a number of scales and wrote down their average was used for the analysis. thoughts about each ad.
All respondents then completed a five-minute distraction task which asked about their own orange juice Manipulation Check consumption. Respondents were subsequently asked to It was predicted that the transformational wording of recall in their own words their taste experience with advertising would cause respondents to conjure up sen-Orange Grove. They were asked to pick three words sory aspects of Orange Grove's taste. Respondents rated that best described their memory of Orange Grove's and gave feedback on the two ad campaigns. The judges taste.
looked at this feedback for mentions of sensory aspects Then respondents were given five samples of orange of the juice, whether respondents mentioned taste when juice and were asked to identify the one they remember asked what the ad made them ''think about'' and if rehaving tasted earlier in the hour. They were told that one spondents mentioned any autobiographical experiences among the five samples was exactly as they had tasted with orange juice. Eighty-five percent of respondents earlier. The samples were numbered 1 to 5, with 1 being mentioned taste or sensory aspects of the juice somewhere the worst tasting and 5 being the best tasting. Respondents in these ad evaluations. For instance, one respondent in were not told the meaning of this ordering. They were the ''bad'' orange juice condition said the ad made him told to sample each in numeric order and to defer making think of ''a juicy orange bursting in my mouth.'' Seventyan identification until all five had been sampled. 2 They two percent of respondents specifically mentioned orange were offered crackers to cleanse their palate between each ''taste'' when asked directly, ''What did the ad make you sample.
think about?'' A common response was, ''Eating fresh After they identified the sample they believed to be oranges.'' Others directly mentioned the imagination pro-Orange Grove, respondents distinguished between states cess: one respondent in the ''medium'' taste condition of awareness using the process developed by Tulving wrote, ''The best orange juice I could ever imagine. '' (1985) . In addition, a guess option was offered for those Fourteen percent of respondents conjured up their own respondents who had no memory of the orange juice's past experiences when viewing the ads; one respondent taste (in order to rule out a guessing bias in the recogniin the ''good'' experience group said the ad made her tion test). Respondents were told a ''remember'' judgthink of ''fresh squeezed orange juice like Mom used to ment is the strongest type of memory judgment and to make.'' The judges found no difference in the number indicate so if their memory for the orange juice apreporting sensory images or taste experiences across the proached a reexperiencing of it, that is, if they could taste quality levels, F õ 1. 3 the juice in their mind's eye. They were told to indicate a memory judgment as a ''know'' if it was based more on recognition or familiarity and if somehow the taste Recall seemed appropriate, whether or not they could recall the prior taste itself. And they were told to indicate a memory Respondents had five minutes to describe in detail judgment as a ''guess'' if they randomly selected one of memory of their taste experience of Orange Grove. The the five samples as the Orange Grove and they had no judges coded respondents' free recalls for the number recollection of its taste. of words used in the description; the total number of The respondents then rated their confidence in memindependent thoughts; whether the thoughts seemed posiory identification and subsequently were told that the tive, negative, or neutral; and whether any words (or experimenter would be giving them 50 cents at the end variants of words) that had appeared in the ads describing of the experiment as a ''thank you,'' and that they had the option of betting this money on their identification memory. They could choose to keep the full 50 cents 3 This was meant to be a manipulation check rather than a process and not wager anything, they could bet all if they betracing measure. It is very possible that those who did not write down lieved they had been correct, or bet values in between. thinking about the taste, conjured it up. During the ad viewing, respondents were not asked specifically to think about the taste of the orange Finally, respondents rated their overall evaluations of juice but, rather, to rate the ads. The correlation between those who the Orange Grove juice. mentioned taste and subsequently reported a distorted memory was r Å .26. Of the 67 respondents that mentioned taste, 51 reported a taste identification other than accurate, with 40 choosing a more favorable 2 This was done so that any order bias would be controlled for. taste match.
/ 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res Orange Grove's taste appeared in those descriptions. The results by condition appear in Table 1 .
TASTE RECOGNITION
There was no significant difference between conditions on the quantitative aspects of recall (e.g., number of
Bad
Medium Good words and thoughts). The conditions differed in the quali- 
As predicted, respondents were more likely to use the distortion) to those who reported accurate identifications. descriptive terms from the ad (compared to the control The advertising language was significantly more likely groups) when describing their own taste experience, F(1, to appear in those misled or random respondents' recall 149) Å 4.20, p Å.04, and in their choice of the three statements, X V Å 2.24 words, than for accurate responwords that best describe the juice, F(1, 149) Å 2.66, dents, X V Å 1.3; F(1, 78) Å 6.63, p Å .01. p Å .01. Neither the type of experience nor the interaction were significant factors. To further investigate the role Memory Identification language played on respondents' taste memories, a comparison was done between those respondents who re-
Respondents were asked to pick the sample that they had tasted earlier in the hour. The distributions for each ceived the advertising and later identified a juice other than the one they tasted as being Orange Grove (memory condition appear in Table 2. / 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res Accuracy was higher when respondents did not receive judgments, 40 percent for misled, 38 percent for accurate; and no difference in amount bet, 36 cents for accurate the advertising information, demonstrating that the postexperience advertising information overshadowed the versus 40 cents for misled. 5 One might argue that those who received the advertis-perceptual experience and impaired memory; accuracy for control was 46 percent, and for advertising, 26 percent;
ing information had more information and thus would be more confident in their decisions (e.g., knowingly up-significantly different, x 2 (1, N Å 150) Å 6.190, p Å .013. More critical, the statistical analyses confirmed the power dated their beliefs). Differences between those who received the ad information and those who did not were of the advertising information to positively transform the perceptual memories of consumers' taste experiences, as also examined, but there was no difference: X V Å 66 for confidence for those who received the ad, X V Å 64 for no-respondents were more likely to choose a more favorable sample to represent their original experience if they re-ad groups; X V Å 37 cents bet for ad groups, X V Å 36 cents bet for no-ad groups; and 36 percent ''remember'' for ad ceived the ads. Because the dependent variable-the choice of the orange juice-was ordinally scaled where groups, 37 percent for no-ad groups. In short, there was no objective manner to differentiate an ''accurate'' memory 1 was the worst tasting and 5 was the best tasting, a categorical data analysis procedure was used to analyze from a ''misled'' one created by the advertising. the means of the recognition data. With this analysis, both the main effects (e.g., ad and level of experience) and
Overall Evaluations their interaction could be incorporated into the model.
The interest was in whether or not these changes in Both advertising and level of experience were found to be sensory memories would translate to overall evaluations significant factors: advertising x 2 (1, N Å 150) Å 27.64, of the juice. The seven subjective measures loaded on p õ .00001; and level of experience x 2 (2, N Å 150) one factor, with coefficient alpha of .95. They were com-Å 23.19, p õ .00001; the interaction was nonsignificant, bined to form an index of subjective evaluation. Advertisx 2 õ 2.
ing was a significant factor, F(1, 149) Å 21.45, p Å .0001; the level of experience was significant at F(2, Type of Memory Judgments 149) Å 11.8, p Å .0001. The interaction was nonsignifi-In order to demonstrate that these taste memories had cant, F õ 1, therefore assimilation of the postexperience become reconstructed and seemed real to the respondents, advertising occurred at all levels of experience. several measures were taken: R/K/G to get at the consciousness of the recollection; a confidence scale an-Discussion chored from 0, ''not at all sure correct,'' to 100, ''ex-
The purpose of this study was to demonstrate that posttremely sure correct''; and the bet, where they could bet experience advertising could make consumers think that anything from 0 to 50 cents on their memory identificathey had tasted a more flavorful juice by altering their tion. 4 memories of the tasting experience. The statistical analy-For this first analysis, only respondents who received ses confirmed the power of suggestive advertising to the advertising information were included. They were ditransform memories, but the respondents' verbatim words vided into two groups: those who reported ''accurate'' more clearly demonstrate the impact. For instance, one memories, and those who reported ''misled'' or respondent who had tasted the vinegar-tinged salty orange ''blended'' memories. The latter group was defined as water and received the ad information described his memthose respondents in the advertising conditions who chose ory of the orange juice's taste in these words, ''I thought a more favorable identification match for the Orange it tasted real sweet. It quenched my thirst. Refreshing. It Grove (41 respondents). There were 20 respondents who would be a nice eye-opener in the morning. It made me reported correct memory judgments. It was expected that want more.'' Another respondent who tasted the same if those who had been misled by the advertising did so juice but who did not receive the advertising information because they thought their experiences ambiguous and described his memory as, ''I thought this juice was pretty were reporting based on confusion rather than a belief that their taste experience was as identified in the recognition test, then they would report lower confidence, less ''remember'' judgments, and would bet less than their 5 For the purposes of this investigation null results are interesting because, based on current theory, we might expect great differences, accurate counterparts. This was not the case. There were and for the purpose of the present investigation they were not found. no differences in confidence, X V Å 67 for misled, X V Å 68 Of course, at some level a difference, no matter how minute, can be for accurate; no difference in percentage of ''remember'' found statistically different. Power depends on sample size (within groups), effect size, the number of groups, and the standard error; where the noncentrality parameter f Å (h j a 2 )/(as), where h j is the number 4 As Donaldson (1996) found, confidence and R/K was correlated, r within each group, a is the treatment effect, a is the number of groups and s is the standard error (as per Feldt [1993] , p. 40). With the Å .49, but not so high that they were measuring the same thing. The bet was not highly correlated with either confidence, r Å .18, or the R/ present standard deviations and sample size, a treatment effect of 13 for confidence, 30 percent for remember, and 10 for amount be would K measure, r Å .10, so it may have been measuring something else, like risk taking.
have been needed to achieve a power of .75. / 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res terrible. It was bitter and watered-down.'' 6 Though both demand effects or recency in presentation. This is similar to the argument made by Hoch and Ha (1986) who state respondents experienced the same bad juice, this experiment demonstrates that these experiences can be mallea-that the recently received information inhibits rather than changes recall of the actual experience. The recognition ble ex post facto at both objective and affective levels, and what the consumer ultimately comes to remember test helped rule out this possibility. The modality match forces respondents to consider their original taste experi-may differ significantly from the initial representation, depending on what information s/he receives afterward.
ence rather than the more recently received advertising. Picking a sample other than the one they tasted (and The alternative explanation to these memory changes is that respondents knowingly updated their beliefs about holding it with high confidence) constitutes a perceptual change in memory (Pezdek and Greene 1993). Experi-the product at the point of judgment. This is consistent with Norman Anderson's information-integration theory. ment 2 investigates the possibility of demand. The R/K measures further provide some insight into He specifically rejects Solomon Asch's conjecture of a gestalt-memory representation where impressions are how these newly created memories feel to the rememberer. Tulving (1985) says the phenomenon of remember-formed through a complex interaction of attributes (Anderson 1991). Information-integration theory assumes ing is determined jointly by semantic and episodic information. Respondents' taste memories were rich, involving verbal memory is distinct from other attitudinal information, and the interaction or cross-modal influence of ad-affective and sensory components. Many respondents reported remember-type judgments where they could ''taste vertising should not effect the sensory representation of the experience itself. In information integration, the newer the orange juice in their mind's eye.'' And as Schacter (1996b) notes, that feeling associated with remembering advertising information should be added on to the judgment; with a reconstructive view there is a constant reor-of reexperiencing the past can trick us into believing in the accuracy of those recollections. What they were reex-ganization in memory. Steps were taken to differentiate between a change in memory and a process occurring periencing in this case wasn't driven by their actual product taste experience but, rather, by the images and words solely as a conscious judgment. In their critique of memory-distortion findings McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) evoked in the advertising. This kind of reexperiencing was predicted by the mem-posed two alternative routes that could produce outcomes that appear to be memory changes but actually occur in ory-reconstruction hypothesis. Perhaps advertisers cue consumers to imagine favorable experiences and thus ex-judgment: vacant slot and coexistence. These explanations will be introduced, and evidence from the experi-plicitly alter how they remember past product encounters. Memory researchers find that both language and imagery ment will be presented which makes these routes appear unlikely, thus leaving us with the memory reconstruction can help people remember accurate information and distort veridical memories. ''Of the sources of memory illu-explanation. A ''vacant slot'' explanation would propose that respondents may not have encoded the original expe-sions our own language may be the most insidious. We depend on language to represent our experiences faith-rience, accepted the postexperience information, and knowingly used it to fill in the missing information with fully so that we can communicate them to others and so that we can remember them ourselves'' (Melcher and that newer information. The memory itself never changed because it was never well encoded. In visual events this Schooler 1996, p. 231). Advertising's ability to provide the language that guides how consumers imagine past notion, known as vacant slot, may be more likely to occur when information was peripheral to the events. In the experiences may therefore affect postexperience choice decisions. This finding is related to recent research by present study, this is unlikely because the target information is central to the experience; respondents directly West, Brown, and Hoch (1996) , who found that external information can serve as a consumption vocabulary that tasted the juice and millions of taste and olfactory sensory receptors encoded this information (Cytowic 1993). Fur-helps consumers understand and develop their own preferences. ther, respondents were told that they would be making judgments about the orange juice at a later time to ensure
The memory reconstruction process is influenced by two types of information: schemas and environmental they would form some impressions of its flavor. Had guessing been evident, showing no memory of taste, we cues. In the present experiment there was little or no prior brand information that would contribute to the Orange might have predicted a more uniform distribution in the recognition test in the control conditions rather than dis-Grove schema, only prior category knowledge, which would allow respondents the background to differentiate tributed around the accurate response. A ''coexistence'' explanation would propose that respondents might have between a ''good'' and ''bad'' juice. Because the postexperience advertising was presented relatively close in time both pieces of information in memory and opt for the most recent information due to other reasons, such as to the retrieval process, it might have been part of the environmental cuing process that led to the newly created memories of the juice. The verbal overshadowing effects have been momentary where the recently generated image 6 There were several more negative statements than the one presented is used at the expense of the actual perceptual experience in the article, but I thought they would not be appropriate to share in an academic journal. (Melcher and Schooler 1996 
EXPERIMENT 2
how it affects other media behaviors. She requested that they return the following week and report on their media This investigation is divided into two parts that study usage during the week. Questions about brands were inthe postexperience advertising effects a week after the cluded in her subsequent survey of generation X. Among information was received. Part A looks at whether the the questions were those of a general nature relating to postexperience advertising would have enduring effects types of brands people their age consider and choose on more typical consumer tasks such as consideration sets when making decisions. There were three levels of interand choices. Research by Johnson and Seifert (1994) est: evoked sets, consideration sets, and choice decisions. indicates that the misinformation (or suggestion) be-Their operationalizations appear below. Respondents comes incorporated into consumer associations and afcompleted these questions first with soft drinks for pracfects later inference making and judgments. Anderson's tice, then for the target orange juice, then for candy bars. meaning-constancy hypothesis says that informational inputs such as the orange juice taste have a fixed meaning Evoked Sets. When you think of ''orange juice'' what that is used in forming a judgment, and any effects of the brands come immediately to mind? Remember that these advertising information (or other contextual information) are brands that define the ''orange juice'' category for occur subsequent to this process. According to informayou, although they may not be the ones you would contion-integration theory, such context changes may be illusider buying. Write down any (and all) brands that come sory and disappear in new contexts (Anderson 1991;  to mind. Lynch, Chakravarti, and Mitra 1991). Part B looks at the Consideration Sets. Which of the following brands state of the taste memories over time. Would the effect would you consider buying if you saw them in the store? of postexperience advertising disappear because it was Remember, these are the brands you think are good no longer more accessible than the actual experience? Or enough to buy, and if priced right (or if your ''favorite'' would the postexperience advertising continue to exert an were not available), would be an acceptable substitute. effect on the reconstruction of the experience? Rather Place an ''X'' in front of those brands that meet these than exerting an influence on the environmental cues at criteria. Mark as many as apply. If there are additional retrieval, the influence comes from becoming integrated brands that were not mentioned, list in the ''other'' cateinto Orange Grove's brand schema.
gory. (Orange Grove appeared second on the list of 17 brands.)
Method
Choices. Below are sets containing two brands, and Participants your job is to choose which one you would buy if they were the only ones available at the store, and you really One hundred eleven undergraduates (66 female, 45 wanted or needed orange juice. Place an ''X'' in front of male) participated in this study for course credit. The the brand you would choose. Do this for each line (choice final analysis includes 106 respondents because five reset). Buried within five other choice sets were the followspondents failed to appear for the second week (these ing three sets of interest: were equally distributed across experimental conditions).
Orange Grove or
Hy-Vee President's Choice or Orange Grove
Design
Minute Maid or Orange Grove A 2 (level of experience: good, bad) 1 2 (advertising: advertising, no advertising) between-subjects design was
Part B
used. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of these four conditions.
After the generation X survey respondents participated in a short distracter task, they then completed the same memory measures that had been given in experiment 1. To Procedure further investigate the possibility of demand, respondents The same basic procedure for experiment 1 was folwere given the opportunity to guess the experimental lowed at week 1, when respondents tasted the orange juice hypotheses at the end of the study. (good/bad) and then half later received the advertising information. All respondents filled out background infor-Results mation about their orange juice consumption, were thanked for participating in the taste test, and left with Evoked Sets. The average evoked set size was 2.7. There was no difference in set size across experimental the impression that the orange juice experiment was complete.
conditions. As expected, Minute Maid was listed most / 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res frequently, mentioned by 89 percent of respondents. Hy-percent specifically mentioned ''taste'' when asked directly, ''What did the ad make you think about?'' Thirteen Vee, the local store brand, was mentioned by 17 percent of respondents. President's Choice was not mentioned by percent conjured up their own past experiences when viewing the ads. 7 any respondents, nor was Orange Grove. Because Orange Grove was represented as a new brand and not yet nationally distributed, it was not expected that Orange Grove Recall would be chosen as a defining brand in the juice category.
The free recall results by condition appear in the middle Consideration Sets. The consideration set size did not portion of Table 1 . As found in experiment 1, there was differ significantly across conditions, overall X V Å 7.24. no significant difference between conditions on the quan-Orange Grove was indicated as part of the consideration titative aspects of recall (e.g., number of words and set more often when the advertising had been received, thoughts). It was the qualitative aspects of recall that marginally significant at F(1, 105) Å 2.70, p Å .1; and differed (p values are reported as one-tailed F for the when there had been a favorable taste experience, F(1, following tests). For the percentage of positive thoughts, 105) Å 9.43, p Å .003. Specifically, Orange Grove was advertising was a significant factor, F(1, 105) Å 4.6, mentioned by 50 percent of the good experience/ad conp Å .02; experience was also significant, F(1, 105) dition; 35 percent of the good experience/no-ad condi-Å 10.68, p õ .001; the interaction was nonsignificant, F tion; 27 percent of the bad experience/ad condition; and õ 1. The number of positive words used to describe the 12 percent of the bad experience/no-ad condition. Presijuice also followed this pattern: advertising was signifident's Choice was in 10 percent of the consideration sets; cant with F( F(1, 105) interaction was nonsignificant, F õ 1. Å 3.37, p Å .06. Specifically, 92 percent of respondents
In experiment 1, respondents in the ad conditions were in the good experience/ad condition chose Orange Grove, more likely than the no-ad groups to use descriptive words 75 percent in the good experience/no-ad condition; 85 from the advertising in their recall in the same fashion percent of in the bad experience/ad condition, and 54 across levels of experiences. Here, however, this was percent in the bad experience/no-ad condition. For the more likely to happen for the good taste condition, sugchoice between Orange Grove and Hy-Vee, a known local gesting that words consistent with the schema are used alternative, advertising was marginally significant, F(1, in the reconstruction and endure as part of the brand 105) Å 3.3, p Å .07; level of experience was significant experience. The interaction was significant, F(1, 105) at F(1, 105) Å 9.43, p Å .003. Seventy-three percent in Å 3.96, p Å .04, with a main effect of advertising, marginthe good experience/ad condition chose Orange Grove ally significant at F(1, 105) Å 2.25, p Å .07. There were over Hy-Vee; 54 percent in the good experience/no-ad no significant effects for the three words chosen to decondition; 42 percent in the bad experience/ad condition; scribe Orange Grove. In experiment 1, it was also shown and 27 percent in the bad experience/no-ad condition.
that those who reported misled or random identification For the choice between Orange Grove and a well-known memories were more likely to use words from the ad in national, superior-quality brand, only advertising was a their recall statements than those who reported accurate significant factor, F(1, 105) Å 5.55, p Å .02. Twelve memories. This was not the case here, however: there percent of respondents in the good experience ad condiwas no difference between accurate, X V Å 2.05, and misled, tion and 8 percent in the bad experience/ad condition X V Å 2.06. (Note: the difference is not found because of chose Orange Grove over Minute Maid. No one in the less ad words by misled respondents but rather because no-ad conditions chose Orange Grove over Minute Maid. of more ad words by the accurate respondents, suggesting perhaps the accurate respondents suppressed these words
Coding and Manipulation Check for Part B
when the experience was more accessible in experiment 1, but the words infiltrated memory over time.) As As in experiment 1, two independent judges coded respondents' reactions to the ads and the recall of their taste experiences. Their interrater reliability was .99, and an 7 Again, this was meant to be a manipulation check, not a predictor average was used for the analysis. As observed in experiof memory: there was no relationship between taste being mentioned ment 1, the judges found that 84 percent of the responat week 1 and distortion, r Å .01. Forty-seven respondents mentioned dents mentioned taste or sensory aspects of the orange taste: of those, 32 identified a juice other than the accurate one, with 25 identifying a more favorable juice. juice somewhere in their response to the advertising; 77 / 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res Melcher and Schooler (1996) note, language may be used 105) Å 31.07, p õ .001 for type of experience. The interaction was nonsignificant, F õ 1. to help stabilize ''correct'' memories as well as to overshadow the original perception.
Demand Recognition
No one reported that they thought the purpose of this Recall that respondents were asked to pick which samstudy was to see if advertising could alter rememberedple they had tasted the previous week. The distributions taste quality of the juice. for each level appear in Table 2 . Unlike experiment 1, there was no difference in accuracy between those who Discussion did and did not receive the advertising information, with 38 percent accuracy in both cases. However, as in experi-This experiment served several purposes. Part A was ment 1, those who received the postexperience advertising designed to see whether the memory effects found in were also more likely than their no-advertising counterexperiment 1 would replicate in a more realistic consumer parts to identify a more favorable juice as being Orange decision-making context or whether the previously found Grove. Both advertising and experience were significant effects might be due to experimental demand. The results factors: ad x 2 (1, N Å 106) Å 18.35, p õ .00001; level here suggest that postexperience advertising can have enof experience x 2 (1, N Å 106) Å 54.1,7 p õ .00001; the during effects on memory by altering respondents' subseinteraction was nonsignificant, x 2 õ 1. By looking at the quent choices. It also helps rule out a demand interpretatable, it appears that the no-ad distributions seem more tion to experiment 1 because advertising's influence was disperse than the ad conditions. These distributions were found with another independent experimenter (Schwarz compared using the Empirical Distribution Function 1996). (EDF) analyses for nonparametric data and the Kolmo-Part B was designed to investigate consumer memories gorov-Smirnov test found that there was more dispersion of taste experience over time to determine whether the in the no-ad groups, marginally significant (Kolmogorovfindings of experiment 1 could be attributed to a momen-Smirnov test statistic Å 1.3, p Å .06).
tary context effect rather than a true change in memory. The taste memories continued to be influenced by the
Type of Memory Judgment
postexperience advertising, albeit not in the same manner as observed in experiment 1. In experiment 1 it was found As in experiment 1, first the accurate and misled rethat the recently presented advertising diminished identispondents in the advertising groups were investigated for fication accuracy and that those who used words from the qualitative differences in recall, (N Å 20 accurate, N Å ads within their recall statements also were more misled. 28 misled). Again, there were no significant differences In experiment 2 it was found that accuracy for both the in the consciousness of recall between those that had been advertising and control conditions had diminished but that misled and those that had reported accurate judgments; 45 the advertising continued to systematically affect recognipercent ''remember'' for accurate, 46 percent for misled; tion. confidence, X V Å 62 for accurate, X V Å 64 for misled; or Recall that respondents had seen two ads, one that willingness to bet, X V Å 34 cents for accurate, X V Å 37 featured a picture of an orange, the other a historical cents for misled. There was also no difference between description of the fresh-squeezing process. These images the ad/no-ad conditions on confidence, X V Å 63 for ad were still invoked in respondents' recall a week after groups, X V Å 62 for no-ad groups; or amount bet, 36 cents presentation. This was especially true when the experiin ad groups, 40 cents in no-ad groups. There were more ence and advertising were somewhat consistent. For in-''remember'' judgments in the ad groups, 47 percent verstance, according to one respondent who tasted the good sus 37 percent, though this did not reach statistical sigorange (with the descriptive words from the ad appearing nificance. 8 in italics): ''The true taste of fresh-squeezed oranges.
The juice tasted like real oranges.'' Key words that ad-
Overall Evaluations
vertising uses to evoke an experience may persist as part of the brand schema (such as ''fresh-squeezed'') and As in experiment 1, the seven subjective measures influence how the memory becomes reconstructed. Bartloaded on one factor, with coefficient alpha Å .95, and lett's schematic view of memory provides a theoretical were combined to form an index of subjective evaluation. explanation of considerable generality as to why experi-Both advertising and level of experience were significant ences may be reconstructed in a manner that is incomplete factors, F(1, 105) Å 7.27, p Å .004 for advertising; F(1, or distorted. It also makes specific predictions regarding what should be used in the reconstruction process: relevant, typical, or consistent information (Alba and Hasher 8 The correlations between R/K/G followed the same patterns for 1983). Within marketing, these results are consistent with experiments 2 and the follow-up study. Because similar patterns of the schema theorists (Stayman, Alden, and Smith 1992) who postexperience effects occurred on memory, it is highly unlikely these effects can be explained away due to lack of statistical power.
find that information becomes incorporated into the repre-/ 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res sentation when it is consistent with assumptions and can and just before recall? This is investigated in the followup study. shape future expectations.
Ulric Neisser (1967, p. 285 ) used an analogy from Donald Hebb who likened the rememberer to a paleontologist who attempts reconstruction of a dinosaur from FOLLOW-UP fragmentary fossil remains: ''Out of a few stored bone
The purpose of this follow-up was to determine chips we remember a dinosaur.'' The advertising condiwhether advertising presented a week after the taste expetions had more fragments to use for their reconstruction rience would lead to results similar to those found in of the orange juice taste. For those without such postexpeexperiment 1, in which the advertising was presented berience advertising support, identification of the original fore recall, or if a week's delay would be too late for taste got more disperse with less ''remember'' judgments.
influencing a memory of a past experience. 10 To effec-Perhaps the most notable difference between this expertively distort experiential memories, advertisers might iment and experiment 1 is in the negativity for those who need to position advertising close in time to the consumreceived the bad juice, especially if no advertising was er's experience, as per the encoding-specificity hypothesis received. In order to determine the effect of delay on (Thomson and Tulving 1970) . finds such memories, several comparisons were made to the groups source confusions are more likely when the event and of experiment 1. 9 The first comparison was with the recall the postexperience suggestion give rise to highly similar statements, specifically those who tasted the bad juice. memory records. In addition, if respondents form a judg-Both time and advertising were significant factors; with ment about the experience at week 1, researchers find the advertising there were more favorable thoughts, marthat such judgments are less susceptible to interfering ginally significant at F(1, 102) Å 2.73, p Å .1 for percent information (Lynch and Srull 1982) . Alternatively, adfavorable thoughts and F(1, 102) Å 3.33, p Å .07 for vertising might have an even greater effect on memory percent negative ones; and over time there were more reconstruction after the to-be-remembered experience has negative thoughts, F(1, 102) Å 5.72, p Å .02 for percent had time to fade (Loftus 1979; Payne, Toglia, and Anasnegative thoughts and marginally significant , F(1, 102) tasi 1994). Å 2.72, p Å .1, for percent positive thoughts. There were no other significant differences between the recall statements. A similar pattern emerged in the overall evaluations. Although both the good orange juice groups had Method evaluations very similar to those in experiment 1 (X V Å 68 for good juice/ad, X V Å 49 good juice/no-ad group in Participants experiment 1; X V Å 62 good juice/ad, and X V Å 49 good Forty-seven undergraduates (23 female, 24 male) parjuice/no-ad group), the bad juice evaluation seemed to ticipated in this follow-up study for course credit. grow more negative, especially for the bad/no-ad group (the means had been X V Å 46 bad juice/ad and X V Å 34 bad juice/no-ad group in experiment 1, compared to Design and Procedure X V Å 37 bad juice/ad and X V Å 26 bad juice/no-ad group for experiment 2). Using the index as the dependent vari-Respondents tasted the (good/bad) orange juice at able and time and advertising as the independent variweek 1 and received the advertising a week later just ables, the interaction was significant, F(1, 102)Å 4.05, before recall (as in experiment 1). p Å .04, with the bad/no-ad group significantly lower.
Can marketers reverse that negative trend by presenting the postexperience advertising a week after the experience 10 A reviewer noted that it was inappropriate to make comparisons across experiments. This concern is noted, and future research should 9 In order to ensure the groups were similar on orange juice prefer-consider doing a full experiment that incorporates delay. Efforts were made to ensure that testing conditions and respondents were similar ences, several measures were taken within one of the distraction tasks.
Respondents were asked to indicate how often they buy orange juice across these experiments, however. The same presenters were used across the experiments. The sessions were run in the same building. (overall X V Å 4.4 for experiment 1, X V Å 4.3 for experiment 2, and X V Å 4.2 for the follow-up study, on a 1-6 scale with 6 being ''very fre-
The experiments were all conducted within the first two weeks of the semester to ensure motivated respondents, and the subject pool from quently''); how knowledgeable they are regarding orange juice (X V Å 4.1 for experiment 1, X V Å 4.1 for experiment 2, X V Å 4.2 for the follow-which these respondents came represented similar demographic characteristics. Respondents in the later studies (experiment 2 and the follow-up, also on a 1-6 scale with 6 being ''very knowledgeable''); whether or not they have ever had fresh-squeezed orange juice (X V Å 82 percent up) were asked whether or not they had heard anything about this experiment prior to their participation in it. None had. The same taste had in experiment 1; X V Å 86 percent in experiment 2; and X V Å 85 percent for the follow-up); whether or not they liked orange juice ( X V stimuli and advertising were used across all conditions. In addition, the background knowledge measures regarding orange juice showed no Å 93 percent for experiment 1, X V Å 92 percent for experiment 2; and X V Å 89 percent for the follow-up). There were no significant differences significant difference across studies. Because the basic cognitive process studied within these experiments is unlikely to vary from semester to across studies on any of these measures, F õ 1 in all cases. In addition, this analysis was also done within the cells of each study, and again no semester, and the effect of delay is important for learning about advertising's influence on memory, these comparisons were included. differences were found. 
Coding and Manipulation Check
received the advertising identified a more favorable sample than did the control group, x 2 (1, N Å 101) Å 30.09, The same coding procedures described earlier were folp õ .00001. The postexperience advertising exerted more lowed. The judges' interrater reliability was .95, and an impact on recognition when it occurred right before the average was used for the analysis. As found in the previtest than in experiment 2 when it had a week to fade, x 2 ous experiments, 90 percent of the respondents noted the (N Å 96) Å 2.48, p Å .05; and was also more influential sensory aspects of the juice while reading the ad, 63 than experiment 1 when the experience had been more percent specifically noted taste when asked what the ad accessible, marginally significant at x 2 (N Å 99) Å 2.31, made them think about, and 15 percent mentioned past p Å .06. experiences with orange juice.
Quality of Memories Recall
The created memories formed through postexperience The free recall results by condition appear in the lower advertising were held with high confidence, X V Å 65, and part of Table 1. The first comparison of interest is to the respondents were willing to bet on them, X V Å 38 cents. control condition of experiment 2 to demonstrate advertis-There were no significant differences in these measures ing's effect even after a week's delay. There were more between this and the previous experiments, F õ 1 in both positive thoughts when respondents received the advertiscases. The phenomenological aspects did differ, however. ing at recall, F(1, 99) Å 13.65, p õ .001, and had a good Forty-three percent reported ''remember'' judgments in taste, F(1, 99) Å 13.95, p õ .001; less negative thoughts this experiment, which is marginally more significant than with the advertising, F(1, 99) Å 21.7, p õ .001, and the the 28 percent in experiment 1, x 2 (N Å 100) Å 2.22, good taste, F(1, 99) Å 7.77, p Å .006; and more ad terms p Å .06, but not significantly different than the 47 percent used in recall regardless of type of experience, F (1, 99) in experiment 2. There was no significant difference in Å 4.81, p Å .03, with the interaction nonsignificant. There the number of guesses across these postexperience adverwere so few accurate responses (N Å 9) that the comparitising conditions, x 2 õ 1. son between the accurate and misled respondents was unwarranted.
The next comparison was between the advertising con-
Overall Evaluations
ditions of experiments 1 and 2. As noted in experiment As in the other experiments, the subjective measures 2, there was a negative shift when the advertising had a loaded on one factor with coefficient alpha Å .94, and an week to decay, resulting in more negative thoughts and index of evaluation was formed. Evaluations were higher words; a difference across those conditions was signifiwith than without the advertising, X V Å 67 for good orange cant at F(1, 146) Å 5.88, p Å .003. The advertising juice, X V Å 45 for the bad orange juice; significant from presentation in this follow-up study showed a reversal of the control groups at F(1, 98) Å 15.17, p Å .0002 for this negative trend; post hoc comparisons (set at p õ .05) advertising; F(1, 98) Å 25.01, p Å .0001 for level of found that in experiment 1 and this study there were experience; interaction, F õ 1. It was found in experiment significantly fewer negative thoughts than in experiment 2 that postexperience advertising's effect on evaluations 2 but not significantly different than each other. The negadecreased over the week's time (X V Å 61 for the good tive words used to describe the juice also differed signifiorange juice compared to experiment 1, X V Å 68; X V Å 34 cantly across conditions, F(1, 144) Å 7.07, p Å .001, for the bad orange juice, compared to X V Å 45 for experiand post hoc comparisons revealed the same pattern ment 1). The advertising presented at the time for recall where there were fewer negative words used in this folraised the evaluations, where the evaluations were higher low-up than in experiment 2 but not significantly different than experiment 2 but not significantly different than exthan in experiment 1. periment 1. The postexperience advertising effect on evaluations was tested using ANOVA with time and level of Recognition experience the independent variables. Both time and level of experience were significant factors, F(2, 148) Å 2.91, As in experiment 1, there was a difference in accuracy p Å .05 for time with post hoc comparisons showing between those who did and did not receive the advertising significant differences (set at p õ .05) between experiinformation: 38 percent of respondents in the control ment 2 for both experiments 1 and 2; F(1, 148) Å 40.62, groups, 17 percent from the ad groups, which is signifip õ .0001 for level of experience. cantly different at x 2 (1, N Å 101) Å 5.02, p Å .03. This accuracy rate in the ad groups was not significantly different from that of experiment 1 (x 2 õ 1) but was less Discussion than experiment 2 (x 2 (1, N Å 97) Å 4.76, p Å .03), indicating that memory impairment returns when the ad This study found that the postexperience advertising's overshadowing effect that occurred just prior to recall in is presented close in time to the memory test. As found / 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res experiment 1 was reinstated after a week's decay of the not detect its influence.'' The ease to which the recalled information comes to mind may provide a cue to its valid-original taste experience, reversing the negative shift observed in experiment 2. It appears that the postexperience ity (Menon, Raghubir, and Schwarz 1995) even if it differs from the actual evidence. In the present experiments, is working at the reconstructive stage of recall rather than as a source confusion of the information at encoding. the postexperience influence altered memories, whereby consumers genuinely believed that their past had been as the advertising suggested.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The complex interplay between memory and the exter-The present research provides substantial evidence that nal environment determines how consumers perceive consumer recall of past experience is subject to distortion their present realities. Because the limbic system is highly and can be guided by marketing communications. In a creative and fantasy prone (Calvin 1990) , recent imseries of two experiments and one follow-up study it was agings can distort how experiences are both perceived shown that advertising received after a direct product exand remembered. ''Perception is not a one-directional perience altered consumers' recollection of both objective process in which stimuli cause 'brain events' that in turn sensory and affective components of that experience. In get converted into an internal experience of an outside experiment 1, postexperience advertising was found to occurrence. Stimuli cause 'brain events,' but the way in alter memories within a short time frame-that even unwhich those events are coded depends partly on what the favorable experiences could be reconstructed to be more brain expects and remembers'' (Cohen 1996, p. 47) . favorable in retrospect. In experiment 2, the findings of Cognitive science has moved away from a system postexperience advertising on memory were found to where the central computational structure is the manipulatranslate into a more typical consumer task of considertion of discrete symbols (e.g., as in information integraation and choice and influenced recollection even a week tion) to a dynamic framework called connectionism. Conafter the experience. The influences of the postexperience nectionists view cognition not as the manipulation of advertising were found to dissipate somewhat over time, symbols but rather as a complex mind-brain relationship however. In the follow-up study, it was found that adverinspired by the nervous system. The basic idea is that tising presented a week after the experience could reinthere is a network of connected nodes, each with an actistate the postexperience advertising effects, making evalvation level, which is able to excite or inhibit other nodes. uations more favorable in recall. It is proposed that the Because learning is seldom simply substitutability of a postexperience advertising exerted two levels of effect on new concept, within this connectionist architecture these memory: immediate overshadowing, where the imagery concepts can grow in meaning and complexity over time of the advertising results in less accurate identifications as each is tied to other concepts forming richer networks and fewer negative thoughts; and more enduring, as part of associations (Arbib et al. 1987 ). of developing the brand schema for the new Orange
Connectionist models attempt to take into account the Grove product.
brain's complex interactions between encoding, storage, This new reconstructive nature of memory has implicaand retrieval; thus they can be used to model both the tions for those interested in how marketers can guide effects of prior knowledge or associations on new learning consumer learning (and relearning) from experience, instances and the reconstructive properties of memory modeling the effects of consumer knowledge, and the role found in the present investigation. According to Bruner of remembering as an experience. (1964, p. 4) , ''Once a child has succeeded in internalizing language as a cognitive instrument, it becomes systematically used to transform the regularities of experience with Learning from Experience greater flexibility and power than before.'' The acquisition of advertising terms demonstrates how brand sche-Learning is to ''gain knowledge, understanding or skill by study, instruction or experience'' (cf. Arbib, Conklin, mas can evolve over time. and Hill 1987, p. 99). The insignificant role of direct experience in consumers' learning processes has been at-Remembering as an Experience tributed to marketing communications that create expectations which shape the way consumers subsequently learn
Remembering is an emergent experience incapable of meaningful reduction; memories do not exist for the re-from those experiences (Hoch and Deighton 1989). Advertising that works in this manner can transform con-memberer without retrieval (Endel Tulving, in conversation with Michael Gazzaniga [1997] ). This complex con-sumer experiences to become something beyond the objective evidence at hand.
figuration occurs in the limbic system, an emotional center of the brain known for providing a sense of convic-Learning can also occur incidentally, without such a conscious quest for information. In fact, advertising infor-tion that people attach to their ideas and beliefs (LeDoux 1996) . The present research attempted to uncover the mation may be most likely to influence consumers' experience when they are not aware of its influence. Loftus phenomenological aspects of remembering along with objective evidence demonstrating advertising's intrusion in and Pickrell (1995, p. 720) stated, ''New information invades us, like a Trojan horse, precisely because we do consumers' memory. The level of consciousness associ-/ 9h11$$mr04 02-26-99 09:14:25 cresa UC: Con Res
